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Abstract 	   	  
 
This research paper examines soldiers’ responses to poisonous gas throughout the 
First World War. Accounts from British and Dominion, American and German 
soldiers who fought along the Western Front have been collected to analyse the 
psychological impact gas had upon a variety of men throughout the conflict. 
Contemporary letters and diaries as well as post-war oral testimonies and memoirs 
form the basis of the evidence used. The topic encompasses three strands of historical 
scholarship and engages with each to explore more thoroughly the responses 
obtained. Emphasis is placed on the psychological impact of gas upon the individuals 
assessed. Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrates that upon its introduction, poison 
gas was capable of instilling fear into men whether previously exposed to its 
consequences or not. However, this psychological power was to significantly 
diminish following the production and distribution of anti-gas protective measures in 
late 1916. Despite decreasing anxiety, gas retained its title as a ‘terror weapon’ from 
effectively inspiring fear into men who were unprotected, ill-prepared, and 
subsequently vulnerable, in the face of the poison.  
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Introduction 	   	  
 
Myth supersedes the reality of poisonous gas throughout the First World War, by 
depicting all soldiers as significantly affected by gas, their lungs drowning in fluid as 
a consequence of the green cloud engulfing the battlefield.1 Introduced to the war by 
Germany during the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, gas’s ability to cause 
disruption to military tactics as well as to the psychological or physical welfare of 
soldiers’ led to allied retaliation by September of the same year.2 The continually 
improving ways to distribute gas, coupled with its increasing use and potency 
perpetuated myths of its devastating nature despite scholarship explicitly stating that 
if gas had in fact been that destructive, the war would have ended as a result of its 
early implementation.3 Currently, scholarship has shifted to focus predominantly on 
soldiers’ experiences with the weapon with emphasis placed on the poison’s ability to 
promote and sustain psychological fear throughout the war.4 However, a diverse 
analysis of men who experienced poisonous gas is still needed in order to understand, 
more generally, the impact of gas upon soldiers throughout the war.  
 
This dissertation examines responses toward poison gas by British and Dominion 
soldiers who fought along the Western Front throughout the First World War, using 
American and German accounts when necessary to illustrate continuities between 
responses to gas. Particular attention is given to the psychological impact of gas and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 D. Richter, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I, Kansas, University Press of 
2  For information on the first use of gas of both Germany and the Allies see L. Haber, The Poisonous 
Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 22-83. 
3 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, p. 1. 
4 E.g., E. Jones, ‘Terror Weapons: The British Experience of Gas and Its Treatment in the First World 
War’, War In History, vol. 21, no. 3, 2014; T. Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas 
Warfare in the First World War, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1999. 
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shifting attitudes towards it as the war progressed. Also considered are the isolated 
circumstances of each man while writing or speaking of his experience with poison 
gas. Through a close analysis of a limited, but varied body of primary evidence, this 
research paper demonstrates that fear was not the only reaction to gas, with 
equipment, training, and exposure all contributing to the poison psychologically 
impacting men in varied ways. Fear, however, proved the most prevalent response. 
 
This paper has been split into two sections in order to explore soldiers’ experiences of 
gas within two blocks of time. Chapter one examines the early stages of gas’s use, 
from 1915 to mid-1916. The chapter then analyses the response in regards to whether 
the soldier had been exposed to gas or not. Consequently, dominant themes like 
anger, fear, and enthusiasm have been identified and explored within the context of 
the conflict and wider society. Concluding that during 1915 and 1916 gas was a 
powerful psychological weapon, as men still unexposed to the poison became anxious 
as its use intensified. Chapter two assesses attitudes towards gas attacks from mid-
1916 to 1918, through a limited number of sources. The evidence has been considered 
in conjunction with the improving anti-gas measures throughout the period in order to 
observe the effectiveness of said measures. Suggesting that the implementation of 
adequate protection and training gradually minimised the immediate threat of poison 
gas. Despite this, however, anti-gas measures remained unable to entirely eliminate 
the psychological power of the weapon.  
 
Source limitations have significantly affected the intention and conclusions of this 
research paper. Initially, I intended to rely solely on contemporary documents to 
assess the immediate psychological impact of gas upon soldiers. However, electronic 
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and geographic restrictions have prohibited obtaining a substantial body of 
contemporary evidence. Current centenary memorialisation projects have resulted in a 
fluctuation of fragile First World War documents being digitised and made accessible 
online.5 Consequently, I have been able to collect nine digitised British, Canadian, 
New Zealand and American letters and diaries that record experiences with poison 
gas.  
 
The content of the contemporary responses also require discussion. It is plausible that 
soldiers could have omitted information from their letters or diaries due to official 
censorship, fear of exposing cowardice, or personal censorship to not worry loved 
ones at home.6 The potential for men to reserve truthful reactions to avoid worrying 
recipients or projecting weakness must be considered when analysing the accounts. 
Furthermore, the nature of warfare did not always permit the immediate recording of 
information, especially following a gas attack, as it was common for gassed soldiers 
to be temporarily blinded or for poison gas to be followed by heavy artillery fire.7 
This could allow a soldier time to process a traumatic event and subsequently record 
it after their shock had dispersed, or alternatively, as suggested by Michael Roper, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 E.g., Vancouver Island University, ‘Canadian Letters & Images Project’, 
http://canadianletters.ca/index.php, 2015, accessed on 14 October 2015; ‘Europeana: Think Culture’, 
http://www.europeana.eu/portal/, accessed on 14 October 2015; ‘Canterbury 100: Remembering the 
First World War’, http://www.canterbury100.org.nz/, 2014, accessed on 14 October 2015. 
6 For fear of exposing weakness see, e.g., M. Hanna, ‘War Letters: Communication between Front and 
Home Front’, 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, U. Daniel, P. 
Gatrell, O, Janz, H. Jones, J. Keene, A. Kramer and B. Nasson, (ed.), issued by Freie Universität. 
http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-
online.net/article/war_letters_communication_between_front_and_home_front, accessed 1 October 
2015; M. Roper, ‘Between Manliness and Masculinity: The “War Generation” and the Psychology of 
Fear in Britain, 1914-1950’, Journal of British Studies, vol. 44, no. 2, 2005, pp. 350-359. For 
discussion of men not wanting to worry loved ones as well as issues with censorship see, e.g., M. 
Hanna, ‘A Republic of Letters: The Epistolary Tradition in France during World War I’, American 
Historical Review, vol. 108, no. 5, 2003.  
7 E. Jones, ‘The Psychology of Killing: The Combat Experience of British Soldiers during the First 
World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 41, no. 2, 2006, p. 223. A. Palazzo, Seeking 
Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I, Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 2000, pp. 45-46. 
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some soldiers would immediately supress trauma and reconsider the event post-war.8 
Integrating a variety of post-war accounts of poison gas attacks not only compensates 
for the shortage of contemporary sources, but the combined responses allow for 
comparison to achieve more precise conclusions. 
 
Thus, eight memoirs and oral testimonies have been selected from various mediums. 
The three oral testimonies have been obtained through the Imperial War Museum’s 
sound archive and were recorded throughout the late-twentieth century, posing 
significant limitations. For instance, the interviewer asks questions throughout, to 
guide the interview. Beneficially, the questions asked are included in the published 
recordings, so I know what has been asked and in what context. However, this process 
does not allow the veteran to recount their experiences by what they see as significant, 
so information they may not have retained as important could be remembered falsely 
in order to answer a question or events they may have considered as important could 
have been left out. A limitation relevant to both oral testimony and memoirs is 
reliability, as it is likely the writer could have made mistakes, produced false 
information, or be biased in how they represent themselves, or others.9 Consequently, 
I have tried to analyse these texts as critically as possible, cross-referencing out-lying 
themes or events with secondary material when necessary, predominantly referring to 
secondary scholarship to assess issues with memory.10  Due to the implications of 
remembering, I have selected memoirs written as close to the end of war as possible.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  M. Roper, The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 2009, p. 254; Roper, ‘Between Manliness and Masculinity’, pp. 350-359. 
9 S. Proctor, ‘Oral History Comes of Age’, The Oral History Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 1975, p. 2.  
10 Procter, ‘Oral History Comes of Age’, p. 2. See also: A. Green and K. Troup, The houses of history: 
A critical reader in twentieth-century history and theory, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1999, pp. 230-53.  
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The greatest limitation of using both sources is the time passed between the First 
World War and when they were written or recorded. Following the armistice, 
testimony and memoirs exposed the realities of the conflict and after World War II 
the Great War became represented as futile.11 Roper suggests that personal narratives 
cannot be written in isolation from the public memory of the war, resulting in post-
war testimonies potentially reflecting the attitudes of the time in which they were 
written, as opposed to when they were experienced.12 This does not ensure reliability. 
Dan Todman stresses that veteran accounts must be critically analysed as their 
experiences are only ever partially remembered; therefore, their accounts cannot be 
considered reliable simply because they fought in the war.13 As time has passed the 
way the war has been collectively and publically remembered and represented has 
shifted from contemporary understandings,14 potentially creating a cultural context 
around a source in relation to when it was written, this is something I have remained 
critically aware of while reading, listening and analysing the sources.  
 
The topic of this dissertation falls within several strands of scholarship on the First 
World War; specific studies of gas; exploration of psychological effects and 
scholarship on combat motivation, masculinity, and morale. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 J. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European cultural history, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 7-10; D. Todman, The Great War: Myth and 
Memory, London, Hambledon and London, 2005, pp. 122-23, 152, 187-88. 
12 M. Roper, ‘Re-Remembering the Soldier Hero: The Psychic and Social Construction of Memory in 
Personal Narratives of the Great War’, History Workshop Journal, No. 50, 2000, p. 183. See also J. 
Meyer, Men of War, Masculinity and the First World War in Britain, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 
2009, Introduction; S. Hynes ‘Personal narratives and commemoration’ in J. Winter and E. Sivan (ed.), 
War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 
205. 
13 Todman, The Great War, pp. 187-88. 
14 For a discussion on the representation of the war since armistice see, e.g., Winter and Sivan, War 
and Remembrance, pp. 1-5; Todman, The Great War; H. McCartney, ‘The First World War soldier and 
his contemporary image in Britain’, Internal Affairs, vol. 90, no. 2, 2014, pp. 299-302. 
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The historiography of poisonous gas in the First World War has evolved significantly 
since the 1980s when the first scholarly assessments of the weapon emerged. This 
initial scholarship assessed military responses to gas attacks as evident in Ludwig 
Haber’s The Poisonous Cloud, which considered the technicalities and effectiveness 
of gas in warfare, concluding that it is indeed myth that surrounds the weapon, as 
tactically, the weapon was ineffective.15 Coinciding with this publication was work 
seeking to incorporate the human element into the literature, yet the focus remained 
on the risks chemical weapons posed to wider society and future warfare.16 In 
response to John Keegan’s appeal for greater historical consideration of soldier 
experience during the war,17 a fluctuation of poisonous gas scholarship fulfilled his 
proposed model. Notably, Donald Richter focused on the ‘human dimension’ of the 
British Special Brigade.18 Richter demonstrated that gas wasn’t as destructive as myth 
would suggest through capturing the everyday life of the brigade, using the men’s 
own words as often as possible. 19 A range of publications followed Richter’s, 
focusing on case studies of particular armies, units, or a society, in order to assess the 
effect of gas on specific groups of people. 20  Currently, gas scholarship sits 
comfortably within a soldier experience context but with a firmer focus on the 
psychological impact of gas upon soldiers. The most comprehensive work of this 
nature is Tim Cook’s No Place to Run, which studies the Canadian Corps’ interaction 
with gas, concluding that the poison remained a prevalent psychological fear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Haber, The Poisonous Cloud; G. Hartcup, The War of Invention: Scientific Developments, 1914-18, 
London, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988, pp. 94-117. 
16 E. Spiers, Chemical Warfare, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1986; W. Moore, Gas Attack: 
Chemical Warfare 1915-1918 and afterwards, London, Leo Cooper, 1987. 
17 J. Keegan, The Face of Battle, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd, 1978, pp. 26-35. 
18 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, p. 1.  
19 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, p. 4. 
20 E.g., Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front; M. Girard, A Strange and Formidable Weapon: 
British Responses to World War I Poison Gas, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2008. 
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throughout the war for these men. 21  Cook’s study will feature predominantly 
throughout this dissertation, as his conclusions are comparable to the findings 
throughout this paper. Unlike any dominant works within the scholarship this 
dissertation will analyse soldier responses from varying nationalities, armies, time 
periods and military positions. In doing so, it will produce a broad, inclusive study of 
soldiers’ experience of poison gas throughout the war. 
 
Intertwined with the current state of poison gas scholarship, are discussions around 
the psychological effects of war upon soldiers. Relating to both gas and fear Edgar 
Jones proposes a theory of “gas shock”, stating that gas induced such strong fears that 
a soldiers’ ‘rational evaluation’ and ‘coping mechanism’ could be disrupted. 22 
Coupled with Cook, his conclusions are tested in Chapter two, to assess whether such 
conclusions can be applied more broadly than the British or Canadian experience. Leo 
van Bergen and Roper have focused predominantly on the psychological impact of 
war - in its entirety - on a soldier.23 Van Bergen explores degrees of psychological 
fear depending on ones exposure to traumatic experiences, proposing that fears 
fluctuated from ‘healthy’ to ‘obsessive’ due to new technology depersonalising 
warfare as death was not often a result of face-to-face combat with an enemy.24 
Furthermore, Roper discuses soldiers’ psychological trauma, coining the term ‘battle 
stress’ and concluding that men felt little separated from the victims of warfare, 
constraining them in a perpetual state of anxiety.25 Van Bergen and Roper’s studies 
have provided useful models for understanding categories of soldiers’ psychological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Cook, No Place to Run, pp. 8-9. See also: T. Cook, ‘Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services 
in the First World War’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 62, no. 4, 1998. 
22 Jones, ‘Terror Weapons’, p. 375. 
23 L. van Bergen, Before My Helpless Sight: Suffering, Dying and Military Medicine on the Western 
Front, 1914-1918, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009; Roper, The Secret Battle. 
24 Van Bergen, Before My Helpless Sight, p. 205. 
25 Roper, The Secret Battle, p. 247. 
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fear that are discussed within this paper. Jones and Cook offer similar, but further 
refined conclusions that are relevant particularly in the second section of this paper 
when assessing the capability of gas to sustain its name as a ‘terror weapon’. While 
Cook and Jones focus respectively on British and Dominion forces this research will 
build from, and test their conclusions on a variety of soldiers, whether a private or 
officer, a German or a Canadian. 
 
Comradeship, sacrifice, and masculinity are predominant underlying themes in the 
sources presented within this paper and coincide with a wider body of scholarship of 
soldier experience throughout the First World War. Idealized attributes including 
emotional self-control, courage, sacrifice for nation or Empire, and camaraderie 
defined notions of masculinity prior to and throughout the war.26 This discourse has 
not been forgotten as I have assessed soldiers’ responses to poison gas as, potentially, 
a man who was significantly fearful of gas could have suppressed fears to not show 
weakness.27 Roper has emphasised the connection between the image of masculinity 
and suppression of fear, claiming that men exhibiting extreme anxiety risked their 
‘codes of “manliness” and were subsequently seen as failures of the masculine ideal.28 
Such conclusions have been further extenuated through discussions of combat 
motivation, with Jessica Meyer proposing that soldiers did not want to ‘lose control’ 
or succumb to fear at the expense of their masculinity, claiming that masculine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 J. Meyer, ‘Gladder to be Going Out than Afraid’: Shellshock and Heroic Masculinity in Britain, 
1914-1919’ in J. MacLeod and P. Purseigle, Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First World War 
studies, The Netherlands, Koninklijke Brill, 2004, pp. 195-97; G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British 
adventure, empire and the imaging of masculinities, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 1; Roper, ‘Between 
Manliness and Masculinity’, pp. 347-48; G. Mosse, The Image of Man: The creation of modern 
masculinity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 3-16. 
27 Roper suggests this means post-war testimonies are of significant value, as this context is no longer 
present, see: Roper, ‘Between Manliness and Masculinity’, pp. 350-53. 
28 Roper, ‘Between Manliness and Masculinity’, pp. 345, 351. See also, A. Watson and P. Porter, 
‘Bereaved and aggrieved: combat motivation and the ideology of sacrifice in the First World War’, 
Historical Research, vol. 83, no. 219, 2008, p. 147. 
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ideologies and consciousness of comradeship outweighed individual strains.29 Joanna 
Bourke reaffirms this notion, suggesting that for soldiers, a physical injury was ‘more 
reassuring’ than psychological, as mental conditions implied ‘insanity or cowardice’ 
which starkly contrasted the heroic masculine ideology inherent to the time.30 Such 
discussion remains pertinent throughout this research paper as a possible reason to 
why gas visibly affected some men and not others. 
 
Consideration of morale when assessing attitudes towards gas supplements analysis of 
soldiers’ actions and responses under extreme conditions. J.G. Fuller proposes that 
morale was subject to multiple factors such as food, comradeship, weapons and 
success, suggesting that morale was never constant but subject to endless variations.31 
This suggests that each response must be assessed individually, considering isolated 
circumstances, a method employed throughout this research. By contrast, Alexander 
Watson claims that morale is intertwined with confidence, both in one’s army and in 
oneself.32 He believes that comprehensive training coupled with assurance of victory 
produced and sustained troop morale.33 In assessing the impact of anti-gas training 
and protective equipment on the troops, this dissertation tests these claims in relation 
to gas and suggests training and protection attributed to a gradual decline in the 
psychological effectiveness of the poison in the later years of the war. However, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Meyer, ‘Gladder to be Going Out than Afraid’, pp. 204-206. 
30 J. Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 118. While assessing the importance of letter writing for soldiers, 
Roper explores connections between cowardice, homesickness and fear in M. Roper, ‘Nostalgia as an 
Emotional Experience in The Great War’, The Historical Journal, vol. 54, no. 2, 2011, pp. 429-432. 
See also, Meyer, ‘Gladder to be Going Out than Afraid’ p. 198. 
31 J.G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 29-31. 
32 Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 
1914-1918, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.141; Haber, The Poisonous Cloud, p. 41. 
33 Watson, Enduring the Great War, p.141. 
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underlying psychological impacts of gas became apparent when protective measures 
failed, demonstrating the dominant power of poison gas. 
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Anger, Fear, Enthusiasm: 1916-1918 
 
 
 
This chapter examines soldiers’ responses to poison gas within the period 1915 to 
mid-1916. Demonstrating that fear towards gas built within soldiers following its 
introduction at the Second Battle of Ypres. Various factors are considered, none more 
distinctive than whether a man was exposed to gas or not. Key themes such as 
excitement, anger, fear and anxiety emerge from an analysis of the sources, with 
evident variations between men who had been exposed and those who had not. 
Moreover, an examination of wider social events demonstrates various possible 
influences that may have affected the ways each man reacted to gas. For instance, 
German atrocities, propaganda, anti-French sentiment, and traditional ideals of 
masculinity and cowardice are considered and help to contextualise why men had 
such differing experiences. Interestingly, more reactions to gas are recorded by men 
who had been exposed to the weapon as opposed to those who had not. This suggests 
that, upon its introduction, soldiers who had not come into contact with the poison did 
not view its implementation into warfare seriously. Ultimately this section assesses 
how soldiers’ fears towards gas increased in relation to their exposure, reinforcing the 
concept that poison gas was a terror weapon. 
 
Men Unexposed to Gas: 
 
Excitement about the introduction of poison gas features in various ways within the 
accounts of men unexposed to the weapon. A captain with the British 2nd Life Guards, 
Sir Morgan Crofton, expressed eagerness in response to news of the first use of gas at 
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Ypres, most likely a result of his professional military background that presumably 
saw him interacting with various weapons and tactics. Following the attack at Ypres 
he wrote in his diary, ‘the Germans had overpowered the French near Bixschoote with 
gases during the night. They were now advancing en masse… this was jolly, and we 
at once sallied out to see if there was any authentic news of this affair.’34 He 
continued, ‘this looks like the long expected German boost coming off at last.’35 
These remarks are representative of Croton’s militarily charged attitude towards the 
conflict. Having been part of the British Army since 1899, it is unsurprising that 
preceding April 23 Crofton’s entries reflected a professional approach to viewing and 
documenting the war through focusing on military wins and losses and rumoured 
strategies.36 Crofton’s military experience and professional documentation of the war 
suggests that his enthusiasm towards the use of gas was a genuine response as his 
previous experience may have moulded him to understand an ‘open war of 
movement’ not stalemate through ‘static trench warfare.’37 It is relatively unsurprising 
that Crofton’s initial response did not consider the wider implications of gas used in 
warfare, as no personal exposure or understanding of the physical effects could 
exhibit the introduction as militarily revolutionary. Thus, inability to advance with 
active combat as a result of trench warfare led Crofton to respond eagerly to the 
arrival of a new weapon.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Crofton diary, 23/04/15, in G. Roynon (ed.), Massacre of the Innocents: The Crofton Diaries, Ypres 
1914-1915, United Kingdom, Sutton Publishing Limited, 2004, p. 208. 
35 Crofton diary, 23/04/15, p. 208. 
36 Sir M. Gilbert, ‘Foreword’ in Roynon  Massacre of the Innocents, pp. xi-xii. For entries that exhibit 
Crofton’s militarily-charged writing see: Crofton diary, 12/03/15, p. 172; Crofton diary, 07/04/15, p. 
192; Crofton diary, 12/04/15, p. 195.  
37 T. Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System, Hampshire, The MacMillan 
Press Ltd, 1980, pp. 1-2. 
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Crofton’s response to the arrival of poison gas was most likely a consequence of his 
military background, yet similar enthusiasm was expressed from a man who had no 
combat experience. Suggesting that despite a man’s military position or experience, 
soldiers could react similarly to poison gas. Bernard Joseph Brookes of the London 
Regiment and 16th Battalion was met with mixed emotions upon learning that his 
battalion would be moving towards a ‘gas area’.38 He noted that he was ‘by no means 
overjoyed’ with the idea of leaving for Ypres but that, ‘on the other hand we had got 
rather tired of the monotony round our way, and we were rather keen on “having a 
go” at the Bosches.’39 Brookes and his fellow soldiers’ ‘rather keen’ attitude to fight 
the Germans most likely resulted from recent losses within his company due to 
German fire, which appeared to significantly disturb him.40 Coupled with this was the 
‘monotony’ of trench life that he sought to escape, as suggested by Fuller ‘boredom 
was the inescapable condition of army life’ potentially explaining Brookes’ willing 
attitude to moving to the notorious ‘gas area’, Ypres.41 Two days after receiving this 
news Brookes wrote, ‘after a very hot and tedious day on Friday 28 May we were 
relieved in the trenches by the Cambridgeshire Regiment… they had come from Hill 
60, and they told us tales of gas and fighting there to cheer us up.’42 This remark 
further reiterates Brookes’ discontentment with life within the trenches, which could 
have been disappointing in the sense that static warfare was not the assumed combat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Bernard Joseph Brookes diary, 26/05/15, ‘Chapter 3: France from 1st January 1915 until 31st May 
1915’ A True and Personal Record of Experiences as a Signaller in the Army at Home and Abroad 
during the European War (1914), http://www.bobbrookes.co.uk/diary_main.htm, accessed on 
06/10/2015. [Henceforth Brookes diary]. 
39 Brookes diary, 26.05.15; Brookes discusses the monotony of trench life in detail as far back as 
February 1915 e.g., Brookes diary, 04/02/15. 
40 Brookes diary, 04/03/15. 
41 Fuller discusses the boredom of trench warfare and how this was combated by food and leisure in 
Fuller, Troop Morale, pp. 85-92. For assessments of the monotony of trench warfare generally, see e.g. 
Roper, The Secret Battle, pp. 94,125-30; Todman, The Great War, pp. 5-7. 
42 Brookes diary, 28/05/15. 
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adventure that inspired some men to enlist.43 Brookes’ willingness to be exposed to 
gas is apparently a result of hatred towards the ‘Germs’ and his previous inability to 
engage in combat due to tedious days spent in the trenches. Brookes was not a soldier 
before the war, which is why his reaction to gas differs significantly from Crofton. 
Crofton’s tactical enthusiasm reflected his military past and gas was seen as a tactical 
way for the stalemate to end. For a new soldier like Brookes, gas related to an 
opportunity to experience front line action, which was something other than 
monotonous trench life. Both men highlight possible ways soldiers could respond 
enthusiastically to gas depending on their experience and role within the army.  
 
Men who were not exposed to gas or aware of its destructive capability were quick to 
comment in relation to the French troops targeted by its first use. Crofton remarked 
that gas had come as a complete surprise to the French, ‘who retired in the utmost 
disorder’ but that ‘the Canadians have done extremely well’ to secure the line.44 
Brookes mentions a message received in relation to the first gas attack which stated 
that gas made ‘the French think the devil was playing some tricks and the French 
bolted… The Canadians stood ground.’45 Similarly, after the war had ended, Anthony 
R. Hossack, who served with the Queen Victoria Rifles during 1915, wrote of his 
battalion cheering for the Canadians who had filled the gap left by the French.46 
Relations between France and Britain had been fragile long before the war, and 
during the conflict there was a general lack of understanding and trust between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For an assessment of men joining the war for a sense of adventure see: D. Silbey, The British 
Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916, Oxford, Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 69-81.  
44 Crofton Diary 30/04/1915, p. 219.  
45 Brookes diary, 23/04/15. 
46 A.R. Hossack, ‘The First Gas Attack’ in C.B. Purdom (ed.), Everyman at War: Sixty Personal 
Narratives of the War, London, J.M Dent & Sons Ltd., 1930, pp. 30-31.  
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nations as a result.47 The responses above aim negative sentiments towards the French 
soldiers’ conduct through glorifying the actions of the Canadians. A subconscious 
relationship between pre-war ideals of masculinity, camaraderie, and cowardice, 
exemplify the men’s attitudes towards the French during this gas attack.48 Jessica 
Meyer proposes that, ‘comradeship became for many British soldiers more important 
to the definition of heroic masculinity than self-control’, and that a willingness to 
control one’s fear, ‘particularly for the sake of one’s comrades, became… an 
increasingly important element in the definition of courage for many British 
soldiers’.49 Crofton, Brookes and Hossack’s comments all arguably validate Meyer’s 
claim. Their responses portray the Canadians as loyal, heroic and masculine for 
standing their ground, whereas the French are perceived as weak for succumbing to 
fear and jeopardising the allied line. Each response also demonstrates a relationship 
between heroism and comradeship ideology through portraying the Canadian’s as 
heroic, an inherent ideal of masculinity at this time, as well as exemplifying their 
sacrifice for Empire and fellow comrades that Watson and Porter suggests was a 
pertinent ideology throughout First World War warfare.50 In this instance, the first gas 
attack at Ypres tested the French and Canadian troops against ideals of comradeship 
and masculinity, allowing Crofton, Brookes and Hossack to extenuate pre-existing 
British and French rivalry.  
 
Coinciding with the increasing use of gas along the front, rumours began to circulate 
within wider British society and within the trenches, causing soldiers’ attitudes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 R and I Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France: The History of a Love-Hate Relationship, 
New York, Vintage Books A Division of Random House, Inc., 2006, p. 460. 
48 E.g. Meyer, Men of War, p.10; Bourke, Dismembering the Male; Watson and Porter, ‘Bereaved and 
aggrieved’, pp. 147-150, 163-164. 
49 Meyer, Uncovered Fields, p.207. 
50 E.g. Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 1; Roper, ‘Between Manliness and Masculinity’, pp. 353-55; 
Watson and Porter, ‘Bereaved and aggrieved’, p. 147. 
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towards the weapon to shift. Crofton’s initial enthusiasm for gas’s tactical potential 
mellows to one of caution a month after its first use at Ypres. In May Crofton was 
told that members of his squadron were to be sent to Ypres, he wrote, ‘we shall be 
anxious about them while they are up there, and anxiously watch the wind to see if it 
is favourable for gas.’51 Since the allied forces had not yet used gas in battle, Crofton 
is not referring to winds ‘favourable for gas’ for British tactics, but rather out of fear 
that the Germans will deploy gas against his comrades.52 Upon writing this, Crofton 
was still physically unexposed to gas; however, he mentioned in passing the issuing 
of ‘hastily-improvised respirators’ as well as obtained intelligence regarding the 
logistics of the first gas attack.53 Crofton’s anxiety was most likely a result of a 
broader circulation of information regarding gas and its effects to soldiers’ bodies – 
either from along the front or perhaps information published in Britain. The Official 
report to the British Secretary of State for War, published in British newspapers on 29 
April 1915, stated that gassed men, ‘were lying struggling for breath and blue in the 
face’ and referred to poisonous gas as ‘brutally barbarous’.54 Depictions and rumours 
of the effects of gas coincided with wider German atrocity scandals such as the 
sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania and the publication of the Bryce Report that 
exposed German brutality upon their invasion of Belgium.55 News of the crimes 
within the report spread throughout wider British society in an attempt to inspire new 
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recruits.56 Due to the extensive circulation of British newspapers throughout the 
British Expeditionary Forces, the newspaper reports most likely reached the trenches 
and were read by soldiers of all ranks.57 Germany’s unorthodox and cruel tactics 
created a stigma around the German officer corps, and van Bergen suggests that 
atrocities mentioned within the report did become propaganda that circulated through 
trenches, increasing hatred and inspiring fear of the German army’s capability.58 It is 
probable that, for Crofton, his increased anxiety of gas could have resulted from 
mounting suspicion of Germany’s absent moral conduct during war, as well as the 
possibility that he had been receiving news or rumours of the consequences of gas to 
the human body. 
 
Men Exposed to Gas: 
 
Unsurprisingly, when assessing reactions to poison gas from soldiers who had been 
exposed to the weapon, the most recurring theme is fear. Canadian Private James 
Wells Ross portrayed this when he wrote, ‘And that ---- gas too. The very smell of it 
now makes my heart drop into my boots. Our first experience with it was of such an 
accompanying sense of critical danger.’59 This letter was written on 17 May 1915 
before adequate protection against gas had been administered. Jones suggests that 
before the distribution of effective gas masks in mid-1916, it was general 
unpreparedness to the weapon that established anxiety and solidified the poison as a 	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‘terror weapon.’60 Therefore the ‘sense of critical danger’ gas entailed for Ross was 
most likely a result of inadequate protection, lack of training, or circulating rumours 
of gas.61 Bernard Brookes, who had been in close proximity to gas on multiple 
occasions by July 1915 but had not been harmed due to having an early-developed 
gas mask, displayed extreme panic when ‘in a blissful ignorance’ he had left his 
respirator in the trench as he had set out on foot. Smelling gas along his journey he 
‘wondered what length of time I had left to live’, in this instance it was not gas 
Brookes had smelt but the fumes of multiple ambulances. Brookes noted, ‘I cannot 
say that usually I enjoy the fumes of motor cars… but on this occasion nothing could 
have been sweeter.’62 This response reflects Jones’ conclusion that gas had the 
‘capacity to inspire strong emotion’ making men panic and misinterpret ‘harmless 
sounds and smells’ due to its psychological power.63 Furthermore, Cook suggests that 
gas propaganda illuminated the horrific effects of gas, extenuating anxieties for front 
line, ill-equipped soldiers.64 The innate fear of gas demonstrated by both men is most 
likely a consequence of their previous exposure to gas, suggesting that in a state of 
panic men could associate being in close proximity to gas, unprotected, to death.  
 
Men who saw the effects of gas on other soldiers also exhibited extreme fear. These 
men were not themselves harmed by gas, but witnessing soldiers being gassed 
instigated a psychological trauma that for one reason or another mentally scarred the 
individual or made them dread the weapon, a consequence of fear Roper suggests was 
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61 For similar expressions of fear by Canadian soldiers, see, Cook, No Place to Run, pp. 38-39, 44-45. 
62 Brookes Diary, 10/07/1915.  
63 Jones, ‘Terror Weapons’, p. 263. 
64 Cook, No Place to Run, pp. 33-35. 
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common in warfare more generally.65 British private of the North Staffordshire 
Regiment, Bernard Martin, recounted an incident at Ypres in 1916 when during a gas 
attack one man did not have a gas mask. Martin describes the man without a mask as 
‘expressing horror’. He goes on to explain: 
 
Before the cloud of gas reformed I saw this man lurch sideways, arms 
outstretched, attempting to pull off another man’s mask: a third, wielding what 
I judged to be a bit of broken duckboard, pressed between the two. I saw one 
of them fall to the ground. All over in a moment, a vivid picture in my mind 
for ever, and ever, and ever, and ever.66 
 
Evidently, Martin expressed an emotional and resonating response to gas’s ability to 
psychologically disturb a fellow soldier. Recording his war experience in 1985, at the 
age of eighty-eight, proves the significance of this event to Martin.67 Samuel Hynes 
proposes that memoirs allow for a ‘greater element of reflection’ and through 
remembering specific events the focus becomes somewhat reflective, allowing 
‘meaning and subject-response.’68 Hynes’ conclusion is confirmed by Roper who 
suggests that post-war writing allowed memories that had remained ‘stuck in the 
mind’ to be recorded freely, thus reflecting the importance of the event to the 
soldier.69 Although the immediate details of the incident may be inaccurate, the ‘vivid 
memory’ Martin revealed illustrates the meaning he has attributed to the event, and its 
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continued significance despite the time passed.70 The soldiers’ act of self-preservation 
described by Martin could have remained predominant in his memory as it 
highlighted the psychological power of gas to drastically alter inherent aspects of 
combat, comradeship and sacrifice,71 as he neglected these notions to save himself. 
This confirms Cook and Jones’ arguments of gas’s capacity to alter a man’s mental 
state.72 Similarly, German Ernst Jünger’s experience of witnessing victims of a gas 
attack instilled a fear within him that he retold in a post-war memoir. First published 
in 1920, his widely received memoir has had multiple rewrites; often these rewrites 
reflect the ideological climate of the cultural perception of the war at the time, or 
Jünger’s age influencing his writing. 73  Despite this, Jünger’s account remains 
valuable by offering a response to gas from the perspective of the belligerent side of 
the war. Interestingly, Jünger’s response does not significantly differ from British and 
Dominion soldiers’ reactions, implying that allied and belligerent forces experienced 
gas in similar ways and suggesting that German troops were no better accustomed to 
gas due to having introduced the weapon. Jünger exclaimed that the gassed German’s 
were in ‘terrible agony’.74 He noted, ‘I resolved never to go anywhere without my 
mask, having previously, incredibly foolishly, often left it behind in my dugout, and 
used its case… as a container for sandwiches. Seeing this taught me a lesson.’75 Fear 
as a by-product of witnessing traumatic scenes was not uncommon throughout the 
war; Michael Roper labelled it ‘battle stress’ and claimed that many soldiers became 	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scared of a weapon or scenario because of ‘… how little they felt separated from the 
victims’, in relation to gas, Jones confirms Roper’s claim as soldiers’ appeared to take 
the threat of gas more seriously after viewing its victims.76 The shock these men felt 
upon seeing gas victims highlights how gas could leave a permanent psychological 
mark upon an individual, potentially changing their habits as evident with Jünger, or 
extenuating their nerves towards the weapon and subsequently remaining vivid within 
their memories. Responses of equal intensity also arose from feelings of anger 
towards gas and its victims.  
 
Anger about gas manifested either in response to witnessing the victims of a gas 
attack, or as a response to warfare as a whole. Canadian soldier Kenneth Foster wrote 
consistently negatively towards the Germans throughout his post-war memoir, 
revealing that he enlisted in 1915 following the sinking of ‘the good ship "Lusitania”’ 
by German submarines.77 Foster stated, ‘talk about dirty tricks, Fritz had them all beat 
with this one’, referring to the Germans sending over irritant gas before sending ‘real’ 
gas. Therefore, men would be sneezing and unable to wear their masks as chlorine or 
phosgene gas was fired over.78 Similarly, Ross, mentioned previously in relation to 
fear, expressed in 1915 that, ‘[w]e English all try to be good sports… very few realize 
what a hell on earth these Germans are planning for us.’ He goes on to reference the 
sinking of the Lusitania, the ‘crucifixion’ of a British sergeant to a barn door, and 
finally, gas. Although Ross’ words were subtler than Foster’s, the responses were 
fuelled by anger towards the Germans. Wider atrocity scandals associated with 
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Germany’s creation and implementation of gas resulted in the belligerent nation being 
referred to as ‘playing dirty’. This term was used to represent a sense of ‘moral 
superiority’ the British felt in comparison to the Germans, using atrocities to justify 
British participation in the war.79 The credibility of atrocities taking place, particularly 
in Belgium, remains contested, however even if not all stories were accurate they 
were widely believed and contributed to the demonising of the enemy from soldiers 
and society.80 This assumption is validated through Foster and Ross’ accounts as both 
men portrayed the Germans as evil, further dehumanising the enemy. World War One 
had a distinctly new style of warfare.81 Gas contributed to this modern shift through 
the impersonal and indiscriminative attacks of the weapon, killing a man from the 
inside out, creating panic and uncertainty, attributing the poison as immoral.82 
Atrocities committed by Germany within the first years of war angered men exposed 
to gas as they were suffering at the hands of an immoral enemy and weapon, as 
evident through Foster and Ross’ accounts which suggested that the British were 
honourable fighters and the Germans playing dirty.  
 
By mid-1916 rudimentary anti-gas training had been implemented and respirators, 
although basic, were administered. However, this did not ensure safety from gas. 
Private Charlie Byrne of the Hampshire Regiment’s 2nd Battalion spoke in an 
interview in 1977 of a gas attack that had remained pertinent in his memory.83 When 	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discussing the gas masks that failed during the attack, killing a majority of his 
company, Byrne stated, ‘we was all well trained. I never remember anybody testing 
them to see they were serviceable. It must have been somebody’s bleedin’ job to see 
they were tested, musn’t it?’ Byrne described the ‘poor devils’ laying in the mud with 
‘soap-suds coming out of their mouths’ as a result of their failed protection.84 For 
Byrne, his anger lay with the poor quality of the equipment being administered.85 The 
faulty masks referred to were P Helmets, Byrne subsequently revealed that preceding 
this attack in a moment of ‘self-preservation’ he had taken an officers helmet.86 The 
officers at this time had been administered P.H.G helmets;87 slightly more advanced 
then the P helmet through extra protection around the goggles.88 This helmet coupled 
with Byrne’s implementation of training protocol, most likely saved his life. At this 
stage in the war, the allied forces had begun using gas against the Germans, yet, as 
Byrne highlighted, protective measures were still less than satisfactory.89 Moreover, 
A. Stuart Dolden, of the 1st Battalion London Scottish Regiment, complained bitterly 
about poorly designed equipment, criticising gas masks as when wearing them ‘our 
eyes watered so much that we could not see out of the goggles.’90 Dolden made this 
complaint during the Battle of Loos, the first British release of gas, coinciding with 
Byrne’s frustrations as the British were developing gas to distribute while protective 
measures remained inadequate. For soldiers like Byrne who were unable to give aid to 
gas victims due to the nature of their wounds, equipment failures would have 
undoubtedly generated notions of anger, if not towards the allied militaries for lack of 	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protection, then certainly towards the Germans for introducing such a destructive 
weapon.   
 
As this chapter shows, responses to gas warfare varied from enthusiasm to extreme 
fear. Soldiers’ responses were affected by whether or not they had been exposed to 
the weapon, or by what they had heard or seen of gas attacks. For those unexposed to 
the weapon, initially poison gas offered an exciting opportunity to break the 
monotony of trench life or to end stalemate. Contrastingly, as the use of gas increased 
throughout 1915 anxiety and fear accumulated, particularly because of inadequate 
protection. Furthermore, wider factors influenced the ways in which men responded 
to poison gas. Most notably, German atrocity scandals which circulated throughout 
the home front and the front line, establishing the Germans as morally corrupt and 
willing to ‘play dirty’ in order to win the war. It is clear that throughout this period 
gas gradually established and solidified its status as a terror weapon,91 as the men 
assessed within these accounts illustrated a developing or sustained fear of gas, 
demonstrating its diverse ability to psychologically affect a soldier. In order to test 
whether the status of terror weapon attributed to the weapon within this period 
remained consistent throughout the war, it is necessary to evaluate the later years of 
conflict, and examine whether improved protection or familiarity did affect soldiers 
responses to poison gas. 
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Panic Meets Protection: 1916-1918 
 
 
 
The later years of the gas war were marked by increased training and refined 
protective measures in response to the rising use of poison gas along the Western 
Front. Initially, soldiers of the British forces were advised to urinate on handkerchiefs 
to prevent gas poisoning, by the end of 1915 cloth masks treated with chemicals 
replaced this improvised protection.92The introduction of new gases such as phosgene 
in 1916 and mustard in 1917 resulted in the British army’s creation and distribution of 
Small Box Respirators (SBR) and Germany refining the filters and materials of their 
thoroughly effective gas masks.93 It has been suggested that the British army rushed 
general warfare training after 1915, yet the British as well as German and American 
armies made anti-gas training essential in order to prevent panic or poisoning.94 Most 
commonly, officers were trained in anti-gas procedures through lectures, doctrine or 
practical assessments and would subsequently teach and practice anti-gas measures 
and routines to their companies.95  
 
This chapter assesses whether training, protection or greater familiarity with gas in the 
later years of the war enabled soldiers to cope with the psychological impact of the 
poison established in 1915. Regarding the war more generally, Watson proposes that 
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‘combat motivation lay in confidence in ultimate victory and personal survival’, 
claiming that confidence in survival greatly impacted soldiers’ capabilities to 
mentally endure conflict. 96  In particular reference to gas, Haber stresses that 
importance was placed on training and protection for British and German soldiers as, 
‘if they thought they were defenceless they might panic and retreat.’97 Both Haber and 
Watson advocate the importance of adequate training and protection to instil 
confidence and decrease psychological strain. Jones contests this through labelling 
poison gas a ‘terror weapon’ as the psychological effects could ‘disrupt the [soldiers’] 
rational evaluation of evidence and the formation of coping mechanisms.’98 Cook 
states that ‘gas preyed on the weak and uninformed’ and that those who had been 
trained were safer in a gas attack than those who were not.99 Ultimately, Cook appeals 
for the ‘fear of poison gas… not to be underestimated’ concluding that gas had a 
considerable psychological impact on soldiers. 100  This chapter evaluates the 
conclusions of Watson, Haber, Jones and Cook in relation to soldiers’ responses of 
gas during the later years of war, considering the effects of training and protection on 
the psychological power of gas.  
 
Of the evidence collected for this research paper, responses that discuss gas are scarce 
in relation to the later years of war. Why so few soldiers recorded their feelings 
towards gas within the years of its increasingly extensive use requires discussion. 
Unlike the previous chapter, the sources analysed within this section are all of men 
who had been exposed to gas. Described as ‘ubiquitous on the battlefield by the end 
of 1917’ it is unsurprising that the responses obtained for this chapter are from men 	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who had experienced a gas attack.101 Increasingly frequent gas attacks, combined with 
more successful means of distribution, resulted in an increase of casualties.102 
However, the limited quantity of responses with content specific to gas does not 
correspond with the weapons’ increased potency and effectiveness throughout 1917 
and 1918. The ‘ubiquitous’ nature of gas in the later years of war could have resulted 
in the initial shock of gas being forgotten, as it became a commonplace weapon along 
the front. When analysing some individuals this explanation would suffice. However, 
‘surprise and uncertainty’ remained prevalent through the development of new gases 
and methods of delivery, a key to its military success as well as psychological.103 The 
majority of responses presented within this chapter are from memoirs. It is possible 
that post-war materials may have focused on the first use of gas at Ypres or the 
British disaster at Loos due to its uniqueness in the history of the Great War. Both 
Van Bergen and Roper propose that psychological trauma during war could render a 
soldier numb to the extraordinary situations of warfare; in turn, a traumatic event may 
not be recorded at the time it happened but would remain ‘stuck in the mind’ for later 
recollection, thus symbolising the significance of the incident to an individual.104 
These conclusions could explain the lack of contemporary accounts about gas 
exposure during 1917-18. The increasing familiarity of gas in the war is another 
probable explanation as to why so few sources exist for the later years of the war. 
However, with increasing familiarity came the introduction of more deadly gases and 
more effective means to distribute the vapour, potentially perpetuating pre-existing 
anxieties of gas as indicated by Cook and Jones. Examining a variety of sources 
demonstrates the instrumental role of training and adequate protection in instilling 	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confidence in soldiers and decreasing the psychological power of gas. It appears that 
when this confidence was absent or replaced by an unconcerned attitude, gas could 
physically as well as mentally disturb a soldier.  
 
Second Lieutenant of the American 111th Infantry Regiment of the 28th Division, 
Hervey Allen, wrote bitterly of gas’s effects on the men within his company, 
attributing gas panic as a result of overtraining.105 He claimed that ‘men had been 
taught to put the gas mask on and to give the alarm at the slightest inclination or 
sniff’; he noted that this was ‘nonsense’ as men often came into mild contact with the 
weapon on a daily basis.106 Allen categorised this behaviour as ‘gas shock’,107 and 
from assessing Allen’s account; Jones concludes that gas had an apparent capability 
to inspire fear from its first use at Ypres, implying that the ‘gas shock’ Allen observed 
was a possible condition from the beginning of the gas war.108  Allen believed that 
men were ‘trained to believe that a light sniff might mean death.’109 This was an 
accurate conclusion, as the United States’ official doctrine issued in 1917 stated on 
the first page that ‘in the absence of suitable protection the gases used in war are 
extremely deadly. Breathing only very small quantities may cause death or serious 
injury.’110 The doctrine stated the information within it was for the guidance of all 
men; therefore, it is understandable that Allen’s comrades were fearful of gas.111  In 
this instance, Allen claimed that soldiers were ‘suffering from the fear of gas rather 
than from the gas itself.’112 This contradicts studies like Watson’s that propose 	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training was an integral aspect of combat motivation and morale,113 however, the 
United States doctrine repeatedly stated that through reacting quickly and 
appropriately the ‘perfect protection’ of gas masks would prevent gas poisoning.114 
Haber suggests of any army fighting in France, that many officers were too lazy to 
rigorously implement anti-gas principles and procedures especially with ‘frequent 
changes of equipment and the introduction of new substances.’115 Even if Haber is 
correct, it appeared that Allen’s men were subjected to rigid training that had only 
perpetuated fears of gas. Another possible explanation for the ‘gas shock’ Allen 
described was the late entry of American soldiers in the war. Watson proposes that 
‘untried soldiers displayed intense fear’ in terms of warfare more generally, and with 
America joining the war in April 1917 it is probable that many of their soldiers were 
nervous when faced with the modern warfare of the Great War.116 Correspondingly, 
propaganda as well as information circulated through civilian newspapers could have 
contributed to pre-war anxieties. In Allen’s instance, training perpetuated soldiers’ 
fears of gas instead of instilling confidence, highlighting that extensive measures 
taken to prevent gas poisoning could psychologically harm, as opposed to heal.  
 
The psychological effects of gas were diverse, some men remained calm when faced 
with the poison while others, like Allen’s comrades, were deeply affected. British 
Private Charles Ward spoke of gas as merely another weapon used along the front, 
and retold having been gassed without even knowing during a post-war oral 
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interview.117 His calm attitude could have been a result of passed time and the 
incapability of his memory to accurately remember emotions and reactions.118 Ward 
witnessed gas dropped on a soldier using the lavatory in 1918, claiming that ‘he got 
very frightened, rushed out into our tent shouting gas. Two of us grabbed a hold of 
him, tied him down on the firing step, put his gas mask on, put our own on then 
waited for a stretcher bearer to take him away.’119 Evident from Ward’s account gas’s 
ability to psychologically affect soldiers’ composure as late as 1918, despite effective 
protection. It is possible Ward retold the event to show himself in a better light than 
the panicked man, exhibiting his actions as a result of his mental and physical 
composure by contrasting them with the panicked man. When conducting a case study 
of one man’s war experience remembered over 70 years, Roper recognises that 
throughout the remembering process the man had fashioned himself, or others, as 
heroes in their own right, suggesting that perhaps this was a common aspect of re-
remembering the war.120 Additionally, Albert Palazzo highlights that following the 
first gas attack in 1915 a British official memorandum repeatedly asked officers to 
reiterate to their troops that ‘to panic and run meant death’ during a gas attack.121 It is 
possible that Ward reacted the way he did as a result of doctrine and training that 
repeated this notion. German Corporal Frederick Meisel of the 371st Infantry 
Regiment joined the war late in 1917 and recorded his experience, like Ward, years 
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after the conflict.122 Meisel recounted a gas attack during battle in 1918 when, putting 
on his gas mask, he discovered that it had been damaged. He wrote, 
 
I had seen death thousands of times, stared it in the face, but never 
experienced the fear I felt then… with the instinct of self-preservation 
uppermost, my eyes fell on the boy whose arm I had bandaged… I leapt at 
him and in the next moment had ripped the gas mask from his face.123 
 
Meisel’s shocking revelation revealed the power gas had in affecting his 
psychological state purely as a result of not having effective protection. 
Unfortunately, further information regarding Meisel’s admission is inaccessible for 
this dissertation, although it has been suggested that Meisel’s recollection of the war 
had rather ‘melodramatic’ prose throughout.124 This extract still remains valuable as 
such an outrageous admission of self-preservation that most likely caused the death of 
a comrade would unlikely be fabricated. Moreover, it seems surprising that such a 
frowned upon act would be willingly shared. Meisel’s account explicitly showed 
gas’s capability to instil fear and alter one’s reason or mental state, confirming Jones 
and Allen’s concept of ‘gas shock’. 125  In this instance, Meisel’s fear was a 
consequence of his lack of protection, also confirming Haber and Watson’s 
suggestions that adequate protection resulted in confidence and less psychological 
stress. Furthermore, Meisel’s response aligns with Martin’s account from the previous 
chapter, of another soldier attempting to rip a gas mask off a comrade when he was 
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without one. 126  This demonstrates that fear of gas could remain a prevalent 
consequence of not being protected. Meisel’s experience showed the significant 
psychological power of protective equipment, in turn, highlighting the underlying 
presence of gas fear that was exhibited when facing the weapon ill-prepared. The man 
described by Ward panicked from being unmasked when exposed to gas, echoing the 
fear and loss of reason evident from Meisel’s account of a similar situation. However, 
Allen and Ward were not psychologically disrupted by the weapon, a possible result 
of training and confidence but most likely due to their past experiences with gas 
resulting in no physical effects.127 Arguably, this past exposure coupled with effective 
gas masks resulted in the men remaining psychologically unaffected by poison gas. 
 
Confidence in anti-gas equipment and training was instrumental in sustaining troop 
morale. The absence of accounts detailing experiences with gas could have resulted 
from successful protection inspiring confidence in the men, therefore, an attack could 
lose its significance and not be recorded. As previously mentioned, Watson suggests 
that there was a powerful connection between confidence, protection and combat 
motivation. He explains further that instilling confidence in soldiers’ ‘personal 
survival and in their ability to execute military tasks effectively’ constituted ‘good 
morale’.128 When applying this to the context of gas, it is evident that confidence in 
both military success as well as personal safety could reduce the anxiety of exposure 
to gas. For instance, Frederick Holmes, a machine-gunner of the British 12th Lancers, 
experienced his first gas attack in November 1917 after two years of service. Holmes 
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described in a post-war interview the ‘original’ cloth gas mask as ‘awful’.129  The 
cloth masks Holmes referenced were P-Helmets, a chemically treated cloth bag 
treated with eye goggles and a tube breathe through, administered in November of 
1915 to protect against chlorine or lachrymator gases.130 Arthur Empey, who fought 
with the British from 1916, described the P-Helmet as ‘at the best a vile-smelling 
thing, and it is not long before one gets a violent headache from wearing it.’131 
Following a chlorine cloud attack in 1917, Holmes ‘suffered no ill effects at all’, 
which he attributed to the ‘comfortable’ new gas masks: ‘I was confident it would 
keep the gas out.’132 By this time British troops had been administered with SBRs that 
were highly effective by filtering the poison as opposed to absorbing it, and following 
their distribution it was believed that gas shell attacks were introduced by the 
Germans to combat the effectiveness of the SBR.133 Although this myth was later 
debunked, Holmes’ confidence in the SBR reflected the protective success of the 
respirator; subsequently, it remained the only form of respirator for British troops 
until the end of the war due to its success.134  
 
Holmes’ account illustrated a calm response to gas, as a result of confidence from his 
SBR. Similarly, Byrne who expressed anger towards the lack of training of his 
comrades and faulty gas masks in the previous chapter,135 displayed confidence in his 
safety through the training he had received for the P-Helmet. Byrne recalled 
information from his training that reminded him to ‘keep upwards from gas, don’t get 	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down low and you kept your arms up… to stop it creeping up your clothes’ adding, ‘I 
reckoned if I kept a cool head, kept my presence of mind, I’d be all right.’136 This 
confidence in his gas mask was most likely a result of acquiring an officer’s PHG 
Helmet before the attack, providing him with more protection that his comrades.137 A 
report of the attack suggested that the P Helmet’s his comrades had were partly to 
blame for their deaths, and they were also not following training protocol when the 
attack began, unlike Byrnes.138 Byrne and Holmes’ accounts reflect Haber and 
Watson’s claims of the importance of training and protection in establishing 
confidence in survival. Holmes’ interview was conducted in 1985; consequently, 
issues arise with what he had remembered, as Dan Todman emphasised, ‘history is 
not what you thought. It is what you remember.’139 Throughout his interview, Holmes 
recalled moments of feeling anxious or fearful, particularly in regards to German 
bombs, indicating that his relaxed attitude to his first gas attack was most likely 
genuine rather than poorly remembered.140 Haber claims that for some ‘anti-gas 
training… raised confidence and so maintained or even boosted morale’ yet, 
paradoxically, training could also cause ‘widespread apprehension.’ According to 
Haber, this apprehension would be dispersed following exposure to gas, as protection 
would mentally and physically secure a soldier.141 Evidently, of the men assessed, 
particularly Holmes, Haber’s statement regarding increased confidence or morale is 
validated. For soldiers like Holmes, who had no previous experience with gas but was 
comfortable and confident with the administered gas mask, similar to Byrne with 
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adequate training, an overall confidence in the face of gas could have been 
established. This confident or calm response to gas could also explain the scarcity of 
contemporary records of later gas attacks. However, two contemporary accounts 
reveal that an indifferent attitude following a gas attack was not unlikely. 
 
Distinguished poet and composer, Ivor Gurney, was gassed on 12 September 1917 at 
the battle of Passchendaele. Writing to his friend Marion Scott after his gassing, 
Gurney commented on the new odourless gas that he found less frightening than older 
gases whose smell was ‘full of danger.’142 Suggesting that for Gurney, fear of gas was 
connected to its physical presence; the potential psychological terror of not knowing 
you were a victim of a gas attack was apparently of little significance to him.  After 
being gassed, Gurney noted, ‘it is just (or was) as if I had had catarrh’, this sentiment 
was reinforced after five days of hospitalisation when he wrote to Marion, ‘being 
gassed (mildly) with the new gas is no worse than catarrh or a bad cold’.143 
Describing his injuries as minor would suggest that Gurney was not gassed heavily, 
potentially resulting in the effects of poisoning not being as horrific as he may have 
heard. However, his emotionally restrained letters could also have resulted from not 
wanting to worry Scott as she was a close friend and imbedded in helping him further 
his musical and poetry career.144 Gurney’s mental health before entering the war has 
been described as unstable and it has been suggested that his post-war mental 
deterioration and subsequent death was influenced by the emotional trauma he 
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sustained throughout the war.145 So perhaps pre-existing mental strain contributed to 
Gurney’s relaxed reaction to poison gas or at the very least affected the way he wrote 
to Scott, as to not signify further psychological stress. Interestingly, he wrote, ‘how 
long will it last? Couldn’t say, but not so long as I would wish.’146 It appears that 
Gurney’s greatest concern was remaining in hospital, or better, being sent home rather 
than returning to the front. These notions were evident in his letter to Scott on 14 
April 1917 when revealing his recent shoulder injury: ‘well, I am wounded: but not 
badly; perhaps not badly enough… I do not yet give up hopes, but very few boats 
have been running lately… and the serious cases go first’. Gurney may have been 
implying a desire to leave the medical tent he was in and move to a hospital or, 
potentially, home.147 This response was not uncommon among soldiers weary of 
battle or longing to return to civilisation, and an injury severe enough was capable of 
allowing this.148 In Gurney’s case it appeared he did not view gas or its physical 
effects as frightening, but rather a means to escape warfare, highlighting that it was 
plausible for some men to remain preoccupied with more significant internal issues 
than with gas.  
 
Another possible explanation for men to have remained composed or unbothered 
regarding gas was their desire to perpetuate the image of a brave and masculine 
soldier, as discussed in the previous chapter. New Zealand Private George Tierney of 
the Medical Corps at Passchendaele received an ‘almost fatal dose of mustard gas’ on 
28 November 1917. Tierney noted in a letter to his parents that as he began vomiting 
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he ‘came to the conclusion that I had a slight dose of gas’ although based on the 
injuries he described this was a gross underestimation.149 He later stated that ‘I began 
to realise… that I was dangerously ill, but all the way through I felt perfectly 
confident that I’d pull through all right.’ 150  Evidently, Tierney did not appear 
panicked in regards to his injury, potentially reflecting his place in the Medical Corps, 
as he was most likely aware of the available treatments and likely outcomes of gas 
poisoning. One line in the letter, however, indicated that there may been another 
influencing factor to his calm response. He wrote, ‘They put a bandage around my 
eyes, and the agony was awful (this is between you and I) – It was as though my eyes 
were full of sand’.151 This statement is not within character to the rest of his letter as it 
is the only line in which he expressed emotion or commented on pain. Within the 
wider context of soldier masculinity, Tierney could have been withholding 
information in order to preserve his image at home.152 Similarly to Gurney, it is 
probable that Tierney did not want to worry his loved ones, particularly when writing 
to his parents. From a preliminary analysis, Martha Hanna suggests that letters sent 
home by British troops were ‘marked by emotional reserve’.153 And although Tierney 
was a New Zealander, at this time New Zealand was closely aligned with Britain and 
‘New Zealanders’ would often identify as British. Therefore, it is possible the same 
conclusions drawn for British soldiers could, at times, also apply to New 
Zealanders.154 Furthermore, Roper proposes that when writing home soldiers would 
consciously try to conceal how ‘they really felt’ as they were unable to comprehend 
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what was happening around them or not to worry family.155 For Gurney and Tierney, 
not wanting to worry family members who were undoubtedly aware of the injuries 
inflicted during the war, if not specifically aware of gas’s effects, were potentially 
decisive factors in what they chose to include in their letters. Interestingly, Gurney 
and Tierney’s accounts are the only contemporary responses within this chapter. 
When discussing soldiers’ concealment of information in letters, Roper further 
proposes that ‘retrospective accounts are generally more reflective about the 
emotional experience of war than the letter or diary’ and he suggests that ‘time was 
needed before a coherent narrative could be constructed.’156 Roper’s argument seems 
to be reflected by the lack of contemporary sources for this section, suggesting that 
men only began to process and understand their experiences with gas, paying 
particular attention to the role of training, equipment, or psychological strain, in their 
post-war recollections of gas attacks.  
 
Through a study of various soldiers’ responses to the war between 1916-18, this 
chapter examined the effectiveness of training and protection to help men cope with 
the psychological impact of poisonous gas. Men such as Holmes, Gurney, Tierney 
and Ward illustrated a calm response to gas attacks or gas injuries sustained in the 
later years. Holmes in particular suggested that this was a direct result of confidence 
in his administered gas mask. Gurney and Tierney do not mention training or 
protective measures in relation to their experiences and this could be a result of the 
men both being gassed. For unknown reasons, neither of the men were protected at 
the time of their attack; therefore their responses were written after experiencing gas 
poisoning, and as both men claimed the experience was not as bad as would have 	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been expected, fear of gas had apparently dispersed due to their exposure. Confirming 
Haber’s claim that gas was not as horrific as men believed. However, men such as 
Meisel, and the soldiers referred to by Allen and Ward suggest that in some instances 
Jones and Cook’s arguments of the psychological power of gas throughout the war 
were somewhat validated. Interestingly, Allen and Meisel’s recounts of fear during 
gas attacks resulted from fear induced through overtraining, and self-preservation due 
to faulty protection. This displays the significant role training and gas masks did play 
in helping, or perpetuating psychological fear. Overall, the importance of protection 
and training is made evident throughout this chapter. Fear and anxiety toward gas, 
paramount throughout the first chapter, gradually reduced as a result of anti-gas 
measures. However, a dependence on this protection created a paradox. As without 
protection, gas’s capabilities to psychologically impact a man are apparent. Although 
protection instrumentally decreased fear of gas through establishing confidence in an 
individual’s safety, as soon as this security was absent, poison gas’s ability to instil 
terror and panic prevailed. 
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Conclusion 
 
 	  
An analysis of soldiers’ responses to poisonous gas demonstrates the weapon’s ability 
to instil and sustain psychological fear in men along the Western Front. Through 
examining the gas war by its early then late stages, clear shifts in the responses 
highlight the increasing power of protection and training to decrease anxieties and 
panic that had been established in 1915 with the introduction of gas to the war. 
Although protection significantly contributed to the decreasing psychological power 
of gas, its overall impact remained lingering and significant, surfacing when 
vulnerable men without protection met with the poison. Encapsulating h 
 
 
This study demonstrates the wealth of knowledge obtainable from primary sources, 
encapsulating human experiences to illustrate the essence of what fighting against gas 
was like as well as fighting against ideological concepts.  
 
This dissertation adds to current scholarship of the psychological consequences of 
poisonous gas during the war through offering a broad analysis of soldiers’ attitudes 
from various nationalities, backgrounds and levels of exposure to suggest that, 
overall, gas established and retained its name as a ‘terror weapon.’ Richer 
understandings of wartime masculinity have been explored throughout this paper, 
with the analysis presented here contributing knowledge of how gas could, and did, 
alter fundamental masculine ideals. Exemplified also, are the connections between 
self-preservation and comradeship exploited by gas, illustrating the power of gas to 
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drastically alter an individuals emotions and actions. Adding a more refined case 
study of poisonous gas to scholarship of soldier experience offers further insight into 
the connection between psychological strains and overall soldier experience. 
Conclusions made by Jones and Cook suggest that gas instilled deep-rooted fear 
within men and had the ability to sustain this psychological presence well into post-
war years, their arguments have been tested throughout this study.157 Their claims 
have been validated through chapter one of this study, as an inherent fear of gas 
gradually intensified throughout 1915. However, Watson and Haber’s studies 
promoting the power of training and protection in diminishing fear and increasing 
confidence gained predominance in the later years of the war.158 Examining these 
conclusions through different times of the war demonstrates that in 1916-1918 
previously established fears of gas were dispersed through training and protection; 
however, psychological fear remained present - as evident when men were vulnerable 
and unprotected during a gas attack.  
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